Technology Investment Decision-Making under Uncertainty:  The Case of Mobile Payment Systems by KAUFFMAN, Robert J. et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Information Systems School of Information Systems
1-2013
Technology Investment Decision-Making under
Uncertainty: The Case of Mobile Payment Systems
Robert J. KAUFFMAN
Singapore Management University, rkauffman@smu.edu.sg
Jun LIU
Singapore Management University, jun.liu.2011@smu.edu.sg
Dan MA
Singapore Management University, madan@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/HICSS.2013.624
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons, Management Information Systems Commons, and the
Technology and Innovation Commons
This Conference Proceeding Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Information Systems at Institutional Knowledge at
Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Information Systems by an authorized
administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
KAUFFMAN, Robert J.; LIU, Jun; and MA, Dan. Technology Investment Decision-Making under Uncertainty: The Case of Mobile
Payment Systems. (2013). HICSS '13: Proceedings of the 46th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, January 7-10.
4166-4175. Research Collection School Of Information Systems.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/1737
Technology Investment Decision-Making under Uncertainty:  
The Case of Mobile Payment Systems 
 
 
Robert J. Kauffman 
Singapore Mgmt. Univ. 
rkauffman@smu.edu.sg 
Jun Liu 
Singapore Mgmt. Univ. 
 jun.liu.2011@phdis.smu.edu.sg  
Dan Ma 
Singapore Mgmt. Univ. 
 madan@smu.edu.sg
 
 
Abstract 
The recent launch of Google Wallet has brought 
the issue of technology solutions in mobile payments 
(m-payments) to the forefront. In deciding whether and 
when to adopt m-payments, senior managers in banks 
are concerned about uncertainties regarding future 
market conditions, technology standards, and 
consumer and merchant responses, especially their 
willingness to adopt. This study applies economic 
theory and modeling for decision-making under 
uncertainty to bank investments in m-payment systems 
technology. We assess the projected benefits and costs 
of investment as a continuous-time stochastic process 
to determine optimal investment timing. We find that 
the value of waiting to adopt jumps when the related 
business environment experiences relevant shocks. 
Also, when the rate of benefit flows, the time horizon 
for decision-making, and the time value of money 
change, the recommended investment timing and 
optimal investment value will change too. We also 
consider how network effects influence decision-
making for this IT investment context.  
Keywords: Decision-making, economics, investment, 
mobile payments, network effects, stochastic processes. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Mobile payments (m-payments) involve a mobile 
device used to initiate, authorize and confirm an ex-
change of financial value for goods and services. As 
the global smartphone market has rapidly grown, we 
have observed enormous interest in m-payments.  
1.1. Background 
Technologies. Google Wallet (www.google.com/ 
wallet) is using near-field communication (NFC) tech-
nology (www.nfc-forum.org/aboutnfc) to provide a 
real “tap and go” m-payment solution. It was launched 
in 2011 in the United States. Its biggest competitor, 
Isis (www.paywithisis.com), arising from a joint ven-
ture involving Verizon, AT&T and T-Mobile, an-
nounced the launch of an NFC application in summer 
2012. Meanwhile, PayPal (www.personal.paypal.com) 
announced that fifteen new retailers in the U.S. will 
bring innovation and flexibility for PayPal’s offline 
payment and mobile shopping solutions. Apple, in 
March 2012, was also awarded a patent for iWallet by 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.  
The potential profits from implementing mobile 
payments in the marketplace are huge. Calamia [11] 
predicted that investments in mobile payment systems 
using NFC should reach US$670 billion by 2015. With 
the global adoption of smartphones, there are increas-
ing numbers of mobile handsets with NFC connection 
capabilities that have been released by their manufac-
turers, such as the Nexus S by Samsung. There are also 
other innovative schemes which take advantage of 
third-party applications on various smartphone plat-
forms to process payments. Square (www.squareup. 
com), an application that supports merchant and con-
sumer transactions, serves as a virtual wallet filled with 
virtual credit cards for authorized merchants in 
Square’s ecosystem. Ludwig [24] reported that more 
than one million merchants are now using Square’s 
card reader to accept payments.  
Stakeholders. Au and Kauffman [4] discussed 
key stakeholders in m-payment systems. They include 
consumers, merchants, mobile network operators, mo-
bile device manufacturers, financial service firms, 
software and technology providers (and information 
security solution vendors) and government agencies. 
To achieve success with m-payments, all these stake-
holders need to participate and cooperate in a cross-
industry alliance to establish a set of common opera-
tional, process and technology standards. When they 
invest to adopt m-payment technology, the stakehold-
ers face technological risks and various economic un-
certainties, including unexpected market condition 
changes, consumer adoption, merchant responses, 
standards and regulation risks, and so on.  
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For example, fraud typically constitutes most of 
the transaction-related financial losses associated with 
e-payment technologies (e.g., credit cards, debit cards, 
Internet banking, etc.). It affects stakeholder beliefs 
about the likely benefits and costs associated with m-
payments. It also gives rise to understandable concerns 
about whether any specific underlying technological 
solution is better in defending against undesirable fi-
nancial losses. A recent example in the press is that 
Google Wallet is vulnerable to malicious hackers, who 
can gain access to the secure PIN numbers of its users 
[13]. This makes consumer credit card information 
vulnerable to attack and hijack. In addition, the lack of 
retail locations and relatively fewer NFC-capable mo-
bile phones supporting m-payment processes are also 
hurdles to the wide adoption of m-payment on con-
sumers’ side. Some observers argue that the technolo-
gy is a step backward when it comes to point-of-sale 
(POS) transaction support, because NFC-based m-
payments require users to visit terminals for cash.  
M-payment uncertainties. Such is the nature of 
uncertainties in m-payment: they go beyond purely 
technical issues to those involving consumers, banks, 
merchants, technology and infrastructure providers, 
and regulators, and the additional reservations they 
express about adoption. For consumers, their willing-
ness to adopt m-payments is influenced by perceived 
usefulness and ease of use. Meanwhile, consumers are 
reluctant to share personal financial information due to 
security concerns; and they tend to ignore the vulnera-
bility of their own information when there is a band-
wagon for adoption that forms since they don’t process 
all of the relevant information very well.  
For merchants, they are expected to accept m-
payments in return for goods sold and services renders. 
Merchants bear uncertainty risks as well. They may not 
know about the likely extent of consumer adoption and 
the nature and timing of bank adoption. For banks, 
they face infrastructure development issues, changed 
transaction costs, and security problems. Banks may 
not be able to estimate the beneficial network effects 
that will accrue in the longer run, and so lack strong 
incentives to adopt the new technology.  
Research question. We study a bank’s m-
payment adoption decision when facing endogenous 
technological risks and exogenous dynamic market 
conditions. Rather than proposing a standard business 
model or optimal revenue-sharing scheme for m-
payment systems, one bank acts as a decision-maker 
who faces technological risks, volatile market condi-
tions, and uncertain actions of other stakeholders in the 
m-payment system.  The dynamic environment of the 
m-payment market faced by the bank is modeled using 
a general stochastic process with jump events.  
With the uncertainties associated with investments 
in m-payments technologies in mind, effective strategic 
managerial decision-making requires a bank’s manag-
ers to understand a number of key issues. (1) How can 
it maximize the business value of m-payments technol-
ogy adoption under uncertainty? (2) How long can 
investment and commitment to a specific technological 
solution be postponed, up to the end of some maximal 
period of deferral? (3) How do adoptions by other 
stakeholders influence the timing of a bank’s own 
adoption in the presence of changing expectations 
about the relevant business and technology standards? 
And, (4) how should we model and analyze changing 
managerial sentiments in light of decision-relevant 
information that is revealed over time?  
1.2. Relevant Theoretical Perspectives 
Decision-making under uncertainty. We view 
m-payment system investment as a process of manag-
ing the balance between value and risk. In our model, 
the benefits and costs of m-payment investment follow 
a continuous-time stochastic process. A bank has the 
flexibility of choosing an optimal time to invest based 
on the financial economics of decision-making under 
uncertainty [12]. We will examine optimal investment 
timing and identify key elements related to the deci-
sion-making process about it.  
Real option methods. Information technology (IT) 
investment risk can be evaluated using a family of fi-
nancial risk management methods. Benaroch [6] identi-
fied various IT investment options, including deferral, 
staging, exploration, scale alternation, outsourcing, 
abandonment, leasing, compound, and strategic growth 
options, that are relevant. Grenadier and Weiss [18] 
used similar methods from financial economics to de-
termine the optimal investment strategy for a firm that 
is faced with uncertainty from a sequence of technolo-
gy innovations. Benaroch and Kauffman [8, 9] ana-
lyzed electronic banking network expansion, and sug-
gested ways to overcome some of the methodological 
difficulties associated with realistic models for deci-
sion-making under uncertainty to enhance the pro-
spects for senior management application. Banker et al. 
[5] examined Black-Scholes valuation in IT projects 
and showed that the restrictive assumptions may result 
in overvaluation. Fichman [16] argued that, when un-
certainty and irreversibility are high, real option analy-
sis should be used to structure the evaluation and man-
agement of project investment opportunities. Benaroch 
et al. [7, 10] proposed option-based risk management 
and pushed these ideas further. M-payments infrastruc-
ture investment enables a bank to make follow-on in-
vestment in other projects. The uncertainties make m-
payment investment a risky project, and a bank may 
decide to abandon or defer the investment. Following 
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these previous works, we use real option methods to 
model financial risks of m-payment system investment.  
Investment timing. Investing in m-payment tech-
nology is an irreversible decision. Following McDon-
ald and Siegel [25] and Farzin et al. [15], we study the 
optimal timing of m-payment investment when bene-
fits and investment costs follow a continuous-time sto-
chastic process. Uncertainties about future benefits and 
development costs cause them to fluctuate over time. 
Technologies become more valuable over time, while 
investment costs fall. IT investments often have high-
upside potential, high uncertainty and indirect returns, 
which make them good candidates for being evaluated 
with decision-making under uncertainty methods [23].  
Schwartz and Zozaya-Gorostiza [28] contributed a 
cost-benefit diffusion methodology for different kinds 
of IT investment decision-making, when the invest-
ment costs and benefits are subject to change over time. 
Kauffman and Li [21] modeled investment timing 
strategy for a firm that must decide whether to adopt 
one of two incompatible technologies, in the light of 
evolving expectations about future competition. Our 
modeling approach builds directly on these methods. 
We contribute new knowledge about how to support 
bank senior managers’ decisions about m-payment 
technology investments. 
Network effects. Our work also builds upon on the 
network externality literature. Katz and Shapiro [20] 
showed that consumers value a product more when it is 
compatible with other consumer choices. This is 
known as network effects [14]. Kauffman and Wang 
[22] showed that a consumer’s utility from an e-
payment system also depends on how many other con-
sumers are using it. Milne [27] observed that some new 
payment mechanisms have been developed for the pur-
pose of achieving high network effects. When more 
consumers use m-payment, more merchants will be 
willing to adopt this approach.  As a result, the value of 
m-payment investment from a bank’s view will be 
higher too. Such positive network effect affects multi-
ple stakeholders simultaneously, constituting a positive 
driving force for m-payment adoption.    
 
2. The M-Payment Market 
A number of new technology solutions for m-
payments emerged after 2011. The infrastructure of 
safe and efficient m-payment systems is increasingly 
likely to be based on NFC contactless technology, now 
included in smartphones and merchant terminals, from 
the Google and Isis initiatives. Cloud-based m-
payments represent another type of technology solution 
where the payment credentials are stored on a secure 
file server. Cloud-based solutions, such as PayPal, re-
duce customer security concerns, and also take ad-
vantage of the existing online payment platform to 
achieve network effects and interoperability.  
Adoption constraints. Adoption of mobile pay-
ment systems is constrained by the extent of infrastruc-
ture availability [19]. Vision Mobile 
(www.visionmobile.com), a new market analysis and 
strategy firm, reported that the smartphone penetration 
rate surpassed 29% globally in 2011, with 2011 global 
smartphone sales reaching 486 million units [31]. The 
high penetration rate of smartphones, especially in Eu-
rope, the U.S. and some Asia Pacific countries, pro-
vides a natural infrastructure for m-payments to flour-
ish under the right conditions. (See Table 1.) 
Table 1. Mobile subscribers and smartphone  
               penetration rate ranked by country, 2011 
Rank Coun-
try 
Pop. 
 
Sub- 
scribers 
Smart- 
phones 
Migration Per  
Capita 
1 SIN 4.9 8.1 4.4 54% 90% 
2 HK 8.0 14.0 4.9 35% 61% 
3 SWE 9.3 13.6 4.8 35% 52% 
4 AUS 21.6 29.8 10.2 34% 47% 
5 ESP 45.5 58.9 20.8 35% 46% 
8 FIN 5.4  9.6 2.3 24% 43% 
11 UK 62.1 82.4 25.0 30% 40% 
16 USA 319.1 319.4 111.8 35% 35% 
33 JPN 126.9 126.8 18.1 14% 14% 
41 CHN 1360.0 963.1 77.1 8% 6% 
Notes: Data are from TomiAhonen Consulting Analysis December 2011, based on raw 
data from Google/Ipsos, the Netsize Guide/Informa, and TomiAhonen Almanac 2011 
Countries are rank-ordered by smartphone penetration rate. All figures are per capita. [1] 
 
The country-level installed base of electronic 
payment capabilities is also an important factor influ-
encing the diffusion and adoption level of m-payments. 
The penetration of various kinds of cards matches 
smartphone penetration in some countries, including 
Singapore, Japan, the U.S. and Western Europe. In the 
U.S., which was affected by the economic slump that 
began in 2008, e-payments increased 9.3% per year 
from 2006 to 2009, and represented almost 80% of all 
non-cash payment methods, according to a 2010 Fed-
eral Reserve study [17]. Figure 1 describes the number 
and value of non-cash payments in 2009 in the U.S. 
Figure 1. Non-cash payments in the U.S., 2009 
 
These facts suggest the large potential benefits of 
m-payment adoption. First, using an encrypted contact-
less mobile platform or secure cloud server will help to 
minimize fraud. Second, merchants become more cost 
efficient by processing mobile payment transactions. 
They are more secure than traditional card transactions 
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due to the use of dynamic data versus static magnetic 
card data. Plus, the m-payment method also helps to 
reduce potential costs associated with payment card 
industry security standards compliance (www.  
pcisecuritystandards.org). Third, consumers have con-
venience and enjoy additional benefits by using m-
payments, because mobile devices can easily incorpo-
rate multiple payment methods, loyalty cards, virtual 
coupons, and customized discounts. Finally, the ability 
to use a mobile phone allows financial services to be 
offered to people who don't have bank account, and 
others who may benefit from more financial services. 
Given the increase in smartphone adoption, the 
large installed base for e-payments, and the perceived 
benefits of m-payment, banks recognize the need for 
industry alliances to establish a set of common opera-
tional, process and technology standards. Otherwise, 
they may lose future profits from m-payments and their 
central role in handling customer account relationships. 
3. Decision Model 
We present a continuous time model to support a 
bank’s m-payment system technology investment deci-
sion-making process. The bank is risk-neutral and fac-
es uncertain investment cost and benefit flows. We 
include a jump process to capture the possibility that a 
sudden event may occur during the diffusion process 
that creates a shock with respect to the value flows.  
3.1. The Model 
The bank can decide whether and when to invest I 
dollars to set up m-payment system infrastructure, such 
as an embedded-NFC POS service network. (See Table 
A1 in the Appendix, which summarizes our modeling 
notation.) The investment decision is irreversible be-
cause it will be hard for the bank to unwind payments 
to contractors or employees. We further assume that 
that once the investment decision is made, the system 
will be installed and function immediately.   
Technology innovations happen fast. Without loss 
of generality, we consider a finite time period [0, T] for 
investment. The benefit flows from investing in the m-
payment system infrastructure occur only within this 
period; after that, the investment opportunity expires. 
The bank can invest at any point in time up to T, the 
maximum length of the deferral period.  The current 
value of I is used as a forecast of related future invest-
ment benefits and costs. Considering uncertainty of 
investment costs, we assume that I exhibits geometric 
Brownian motion of the form: 
   ݀ܫ ൌ ߙூܫ݀ݐ ൅ ߪூܫ݀ݖ                                             (1)                        
where dz is a standard Wiener process, αI is a drift pa-
rameter describing the trend of cost change, and σI is 
the standard deviation affecting the volatility of I. We 
further assume that the drift parameter of the invest-
ment cost is negative, αI < 0, since the investment cost 
tends to decrease continuously over time, due to tech-
nological progress or the increased scale of the m-
payment infrastructure.  
After an investment is made, the bank will receive 
benefit flows until time T. (See Figure 2.)  
Figure 2. Investment timeline 
 
Let B denote the benefit flow arising from the m-
payment investment. It follows a stochastic process:     
݀ܤ ൌ ߙ஻ܤ݀ݐ ൅ ߪ஻ܤ݀ݖ,                                    (2) 
where αB is a drift parameter and σB is the standard 
deviation of the cash flow described by a standard 
Wiener process. We assume σB is decreasing over time: 
as more information is revealed, uncertainty over the 
benefit flows will be resolved. For example, as time 
goes by, when an increasing number of NFC-enabled 
smartphones are introduced or a standard business 
model for m-payment is formulated, the uncertainty of 
benefits from investing in m-payment will fall. Also, 
the initial cash flow B0(t) from investing will increase 
over time due to the larger installed base and increas-
ing consumer demand. 
The positive network effect should be associated 
with a positive value of the drift parameter for cash 
flow increases during the lifetime of the investment, so 
αB > 0. As more consumers and merchants use and 
support m-payments, the benefit flows will be higher. 
This positive drift parameter captures the trend in the 
value of the network based on the growth of user base. 
Another important assumption is that no other com-
petitors that offer a similar m-payment mechanism will 
enter the market during the period of possible deferral. 
We further assume there is no correlation between the 
stochastic changes in the investment cost I and the 
benefit flows B, so ρBI = 0.  
The bank has incentives to defer the m-payment 
investment decision because of: (1) declining invest-
ment costs over time; (2) the resolution of uncertainty 
of benefit flows over time; and (3) the larger initial 
cash flow from a later investment. On the other hand, 
deferring m-payment investment will be costly for the 
bank. Investing at a later time will shorten the length of 
time the bank will receive benefit flows from the in-
vestment. It also may miss the advantage of an earlier 
mover. Another related consideration is the time value 
of money. When determining the optimal investment 
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timing for m-payment, the bank must consider all these 
factors, which may offset one another’s effects.  
The value of an investment in m-payment system 
technology at time t is the expected present value of 
the stream of future benefits B, adjusted for the rele-
vant costs. Value can be assessed based on the dis-
counted benefit flows from the time t the bank makes a 
decision to the maximal deferral time, T, and ܸ ൌ
ܧ ቂ׬ ܤሺ߬ሻ݁ି௥೑ఛ݀ݐ
்
௧ ቃ. Here, rf is the risk-free discount 
rate or time value of money, and τ is the period of time 
over which discounting occurs.  
The process representing the cash flow drift is giv-
en by ݀ܤ ൌ ሺߙ஻ െ ߟ஻ሻܤ݀ݐ ൅ ߪ஻ܤ݀ݖכ ൌ ߙ஻כܤ݀ݐ ൅
ߪ஻ܤ݀ݖכ, where ηB is the risk premium due to cash flow 
uncertainty, and dz* is a risk-neutral measure for the 
Wiener increment.1 The result of integrating over the 
interval (t, T) is: 
     ܸ ൌ ஻
௥೑ିఈಳ
כ ൣͳ െ ݁ିሺ௥೑ିఈಳ
כ ሻሺ்ି௧ሻ൧ .                      (3)  
Also, the expected value of investment I at time t is: 
     ܧሾܫሺݐሻሿ ൌ ܫ݁ሺఈ಺ିఎ಺ሻ௧,                                        (4) 
ηI is a risk premium due to investment cost uncertainty.  
The decision to invest at any point of time 0 ≤ t ≤ 
T is equivalent to exercising an option before its expi-
ration date T. Let F(B, I, t) denote the value of this 
investment opportunity at time t. Given that B and I do 
not involve traded assets, but instead represent the ex-
pected values of a pair of random variables, they have 
risk premium associated with them. The net present 
value (NPV) of this investment opportunity with an 
embedded deferral option can be written as: 
ܸܰܲ஺ ൌ ݉ܽݔሾ൫ܸȂ ܫ൯ǡ Ͳሿ ൅ ܴܱܸ ൌ ܨሺܤǡ ܫǡ ݐሻ. (5) 
The related real option value is: 
ܴܱܸ ൌ ݉݅݊ሾܨሺܤǡ ܫǡ ݐሻ െ ሺܸ െ ܫሻǡ ܨሺܤǡ ܫǡ ݐሻሿ.       (6) 
By substituting Equations 3 and 4 under the risk-
neutral measure into Equation 6, we obtain: 
ܴܱܸ ൌ  ൥
ܨሺܤǡ ܫǡ ݐሻ െ ஻
௥೑ିఈಳ
כ ቂͳ െ ݁ି൫௥೑ିఈಳ
כ ൯ሺ்ି௧ሻቃ
൅ܫ݁ሺఈ಺ିఎ಺ሻ௧ǡܨሺܤǡ ܫǡ ݐሻ
൩    
                                                                                  (7) 
Applying Ito’s lemma to obtain the differential re-
al option value for the investment gives:  
      ܴܱܸ݀ ൌ డோை௏
డ௧
݀ݐ ൅ డோை௏
డ஻
݀ܤ ൅ డோை௏
డூ
݀ܫ
                                                 
1 Sundaram [29, p. 8] provides useful motivation for this distinction. 
“A risk-neutral probability, or an equivalent martingale measure, is a 
probability distribution on future price paths satisfying two 
conditions: (1) the prices that occur with positive probability under 
the risk-neutral probability should be identical to the prices that 
occur with positive probability in the original model. (2) Under the 
risk-neutral probability, the expected return on all assets in the model 
should be the same.”  
൅ ଵ
ଶ
డమோை௏
డ஻మ
݀ܤଶ ൅ ଵ
ଶ
డమோை௏
డூమ
݀ܫଶ ൅ ଵ
ଶ
డమோை௏
డ஻డூ
݀ܤ݀ܫ.     (8)  
Then, we substitute Equations 1, 2 and 8 into the 
Bellman optimality equation, rf ROVdt = E(dROV). 
This yields a second-order differential equation: 
ͳ
ʹ
ߪ஻ଶܤଶܴܱ ஻ܸ஻ ൅
ͳ
ʹ
ߪூଶܫଶܴܱ ூܸூ ൅ ሺߙ஻ െ ߟ஻ሻܤܴܱ ஻ܸ 

൅ሺߙூ െ ߟூሻܫܴܱ ூܸ ൅ ܴܱ ௧ܸ െ ݎ௙ܴܱܸ ൌ Ͳ.           (9) 
The Bellman optimality equation says that the val-
ue of a state under the optimal policy − in this case, the 
value of the investment opportunity − must equal the 
expected return for the action from that state [30]. The 
action here is the exercise of the real option. The solu-
tion to Equation 9 must satisfy two boundary condi-
tions.  First, the value of the real option must be 0 at 
time T, because the decision to make the investment 
cannot be deferred anymore:  
 ܴܱܸሺܤǡ ܫǡ ܶሻ ൌ Ͳ.                                 (10) 
Second, at any other time, 0 ≤ t < T, the value of 
the investment opportunity is always non-negative: 
    ܴܱܸሺܤǡ ܫǡ ݐሻ ൒ Ͳ׊Ͳ ൑ ݐ ൏ ܶ.                     (11)                 
An optimal decision rule that applies to m-
payment technology investment is similar to the one 
proposed by Schwartz and Zozaya-Gorostiza [28]. If V ̶ 
I ˃ 0 and ROV(B, I, t) > 0,  the best decision for the 
bank will be to wait, if that is possible. Only when 
ROV(B, I, t) = 0 and V  ̶  I ˃ 0, will it be the optimal 
time to invest in m-payment technology at cost I. But, 
if V ̶ I ≤ 0 and ROV(B, I, t) > 0, then the bank should 
wait for the cost flows to decrease or for the expected 
benefit flows to increase. If waiting is not possible, the 
bank should abandon the project. 
3.2. The Jump Diffusion Process 
So far, we have considered a continuous diffusion 
process. It is more realistic to model a discontinuous 
jump process to capture large discrete movements or 
jumps of the value of the investment. A jump may be 
caused by the entry of a new competitor.  For example, 
with the entry of Isis and PayPal, the profits of Google 
Wallet or Square might experience a sudden decline. 
Government regulation could also lead to a discrete 
jump up or down in the value of an m-payment system 
investment.  For example, in some countries, financial 
services firms or mobile network operators have to 
obtain m-payment licenses from the government for 
the authority to operate their businesses. Another ex-
ample is that other financial institutions or card associ-
ations may charge excessive fees for third-party payers.  
The payoffs associated with investments in m-
payment technology, when the related business envi-
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ronment experiences shocks, can be modeled as a 
mixed Poisson-Wiener process. Merton [26] referred to 
this as a jump diffusion process. If B(t) is the cash flow 
representing benefits derived from m-payment invest-
ment at time t and Y is a random variable, then the val-
ue of the investment at time t + dt will be the random 
variable B(t + dt) = B(t)Y, Y ≥ 0, given that a jump oc-
curs between t and (t + dt). We only consider the influ-
ence of a Poisson event that occurs after the m-
payment system investment is made. Let q denote a 
Poisson process with independently distributed jumps:   
    ݀ݍ ൌ ൜Ͳͳ െ ߣ݀ݐͳߣ݀ݐǤ                    (12)      
with λ as the mean number of jumps per unit of time. 
The benefit flows associated with an investment 
after the investment decision is made were shown in 
Equation 2. Therefore, the cash flows derived from 
investment at time t can be written, inclusive of the 
jump diffusion process, as:  
     ݀ܤ ൌ ሺߙ஻ െ ߣ݇ሻܤ݀ݐ ൅ ߪ஻ܤ݀ݖ ൅ ሺܻ െ ͳሻܤ݀ݍ (13) 
where k ≡ E(Y − 1), dq and dz are assumed to be inde-
pendent. (Y  ̶ 1) is a random variable representing the 
percentage change in the value of the investment if the 
Poisson event occurs. The jump diffusion process will 
be continuous most of time, and only a small percent-
age of time will a discontinuous jump occur. The value 
of the investment is represented by the discounted cash 
flows, as shown in Equation 13, from the moment in 
which the bank made the decision to the end of in-
vestment time horizon.   
4. Numerical Analysis  
To illustrate our findings, we assess a bank’s op-
timal investment timing and best payoffs using numer-
ical analysis. We first discuss the meaning and value of 
the model parameters used in the analysis.  
 The bank knows the current investment cost I0 and 
the rate of cost change αI. We assume I0 = $10 
million and αI = −0.1. In addition, the investment 
cost uncertainty is σI = 0.2. 
 The investment decision must be made in the finite 
time horizon [0, T]. We assume T = 5 years, which 
is a reasonable length of lifetime for a specific m-
payment technology. 
 Once the investment decision is made at time t, the 
first benefit flow received is B0(t), where B0(t) is 
linearly increasing in t. We assume B0(t) is in a 
range of $0.1 to $1 million for t  [0, T]. The 
change in benefit flow is αB = 0.7. The uncertainty 
of this benefit flow σB is linearly decreasing in the 
investment time t, and we assume σB  [0.1, 1] for 
t  [0, T]. 
 The bank knows the discount rate affecting its 
waiting cost. We assume the risk-free discount rate 
rf = 6%.  The bank knows the mean number of 
jump events per unit time λ = 0.1, the expectation 
of percent change in investment value if a jump 
event occurs, k = 1, and the random variable (Y − 1) 
follows a normal distribution N (1,1). 
We used Matlab to code the simulation and run the 
numerical analysis. (See Table 2.) Based on the param-
eters we selected, we drew a sample of 100,000 simu-
lated average m-payment investment payoffs. We used 
a large number of samples to make sure that the aver-
age payoffs were close enough to the expected m-
payment investment benefit flows. Our goal is to com-
pare the discounted present value of the payoff at each 
time and then determine the optimal investment time. 
Table 2. Simulation parameters 
Parameter Description Value 
I0 Initial investment $10 million 
B0(t) Initial benefit flow $0.1-1 million 
αI Rate of cost change -0.1 
αB Rate of benefit change 0.7 
σI Cost uncertainty 0.2 
σB Benefit uncertainty 1.0-0.1 
T Maximal deferral time 5 years 
λ Mean number of jumps 0.1 
K % change of benefits, B 1 
E(Y) Expectation of Y 2 
rf Risk-free discount rate 6% 
Figure 3. Investment timing benchmark simulation   
 
Figure 3 gives the benchmark case solution. The 
bank should invest at t = 1.6 years (19.2 months) and it 
is expected to obtain $2.36 million from the investment. 
Figure 4 shows what happens when the investment 
time horizon is extended to 6 years. In all of the fol-
lowing figures, the red line represents our benchmark 
case. Our simulation results suggest that the bank 
should invest earlier compared to the benchmark case, 
at t = 1.4 years (16.8 months), and the maximal payoff 
will increase to $3.47 million.  
When the drift parameter for the cash flow B  in-
creases from the benchmark value 0.7 to 0.9, we find 
that the highest payoff for m-payment technology in-
vestment also increases, from $2.36 to $5.46 million, 
and the best investment time t decreases to  t = 1.0 
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years (12 months). The result is shown in Figure 5. 
This finding suggests that, when the changing rate of 
benefit flows increases, the bank should make the in-
vestment earlier, and it is expected to receive a higher 
total payoff from the investment.  
Figure 4. Optimal investment timing, T = 6 
 
Figure 5. Optimal investment timing, B  = 0.9 
 
To complete our illustration of the continuous-
time diffusion process, we further adjusted the risk-free 
discount rate from rf = 0.06 to 0.03. Figure 6 shows 
that the optimal investment time occurs at t = 1.2 years 
(or 14.4 months) with a maximum expected payoff of 
$11.83 million. Comparing it with the benchmark case, 
we conclude that when the time value of money is less, 
the bank will benefit from an earlier investment, which 
will achieve higher value. 
Figure 6. Optimal investment timing, rf = 0.03  
 
We simulated a discontinuous jump diffusion pro-
cess too. For simplicity, we considered one jump event 
and a positive change in value during the investment 
horizon. (See Figures 7 and 8.) Given a mean number 
of jumps per unit of time, λ, the expectation and distri-
bution of the random variable (Y − 1), we randomly 
generated one jump event.  
In Figure 7, the red line refers to the benchmark 
case, namely, the continuous-time process without a 
jump. Recall that in this benchmark case, the optimal 
investment is at t = 1.6 years. The green line refers to a 
discontinuous process with a jump event occurring at 
time t = 1.2 years (14.4 months), and the random vari-
able (Y − 1) = 1.15. So this is an example in which a 
jump happens before the optimal investment time in 
the continuous-time process. We find that the bank 
should invest sooner to capture this potentially positive 
jump. It should choose an earlier investment time t = 
1.1 years (13.2 months). This strategy helps the bank 
achieve a much higher maximal payoff, $6.79 million.  
Figure 7. Simulation results, jump at t = 1.2 years 
 
In Figure 8, the jump event occurred at time t = 
3.1 years (37.2 months), and the random variable (Y − 
1) = 1.34. This is an example that jump happens after 
the optimal investment time in the continuous bench-
mark case.  We find that now the bank should invest at 
t = 1.7 years (20.4 months), which is quite similar to 
the benchmark case result, but the total payoff increas-
es a lot, from $2.36 to $5.04 million.    
Figure 8. Simulation results, jump at t = 3.1 years 
 
Table 3 provides a summary of our results. 
Table 3. Simulation results 
Simulation Optimal Time (t) Maximal Payoff 
Benchmarking 1.6 years $2.36 million 
T = 6 years 1.4 years $3.47 million 
B = 0.9 1.0 years $5.46 million 
rf = 0.03 1.2 years $11.83 million.   
Jump at t = 1.2 1.1 years $6.79 million 
Jump at t = 3.1 1.7 years $5.04 million 
5. Discussion 
The success of m-payment system technologies re-
ly on joint participation from multiple stakeholders, 
including consumers, merchants, network operators, 
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device manufacturers, financial services, and software 
and technology providers. It also largely depends on 
some exogenous factors, such as government regula-
tion, future technology innovation, and IT cost changes. 
As a result, a bank’s senior managers face various un-
certainties and typically find it difficult to decide 
whether and when to adopt a specific m-payment tech-
nology. To help them make good investment timing 
decisions, we proposed a continuous-time stochastic 
model for decision-making under uncertainty.  
We use Brownian motion to simulate cost and 
benefit changes over time. It allows the value of the 
investment opportunity to change continuously as new 
information arrives, which is not featured in multistage 
discrete-time models. In addition, we apply a discon-
tinuous jump process to capture large discrete move-
ments or radical changes that might occur in invest-
ment value. This approach allows a bank’s managers to 
consider unexpected exogenous shocks in the envi-
ronment, such as the entry of a new competitor to the 
existing m-payment market, any unexpected economic 
situation, or sudden changes in government regulations. 
Taking all these endogenous and exogenous uncertain-
ties into consideration, we are able to develop an opti-
mal investment timing strategy for the bank and esti-
mate the profitability of its m-payment investment. 
Our model is especially applicable to m-payment 
system technology investments subject to strong net-
work effects. Bank decision-makers must process in-
formation related to interactions with other stakehold-
ers in the marketplace also. For example, when there 
are more consumers who are willing to use this new 
technology, more merchants will provide the m-
payment devices. As a result, the bank will also value 
this m-payment technology more, and hence is more 
likely to invest in developing an infrastructure network 
for it. This in turn will make m-payments more valua-
ble to consumers and merchants. In other words, posi-
tive network effects will exist among these multiple 
stakeholders, which, in our model, are captured by the 
high volatility of profits and the positive drift parame-
ter of the benefits flows. Our analysis of the jump pro-
cess also provides bank decision-makers with guidance 
on how to respond to uncontrollable exogenous shocks. 
For example, when a catastrophic event happens that 
reduces the value of the investment to a large extent, 
the bank should abandon the investment opportunity 
permanently. Or if the value of the investment is ex-
pected to experience a significant upward jump, our 
analysis will recommend making the investment deci-
sion at an earlier time so that the bank can reap extra 
benefits brought on by the positive jump.  
Admittedly, the applicability of our model relies 
on the bank’s senior managers’ to have appropriate 
expectations about future trends regarding the technol-
ogy, the market, as well as the volatility of investment 
costs and benefits. Au and Kauffman [2, 3] pointed out 
the issue of rational expectations. They noted that sen-
ior managers may not be able to assemble the infor-
mation needed for decision-making at once. There are 
costs and frictions associated with sorting out what 
information is meaningful and action-relevant. In our 
multiple-stakeholder setting, information processing 
becomes more difficult because bank managers will act 
based on interactions with other stakeholders in the m-
payment ecosystem. The information processing is 
rather complicated, which could lead to inappropriate 
expectations and eventually cause the recommendation 
to deviate from the optimal investment strategy sug-
gested by the related theoretical model.  
6. Conclusion 
Our contributions are threefold. First, we propose 
a new modeling perspective at the firm level to enrich 
managerial knowledge on how financial economics 
theory can be used to support decision-making under 
uncertainty for m-payments and other kinds of tech-
nology investments. Second, we offer practical advice 
and recommendations to senior managers in banks by 
helping them assess investment timing and estimate 
business payoffs from m-payment investments. Our 
numerical analysis provides useful observations for the 
applied context. For example, we show that, when ben-
efits are expected to flow in a longer time window or at 
a faster increasing rate (i.e., a large drift parameter for 
benefit flows), the bank should invest earlier and it can 
receive higher total payoffs from the investment. Third, 
our work also demonstrates the usefulness of a mixed 
Poisson Wiener process in modeling the dynamically 
changing value of the underlying m-payment invest-
ment. Our numerical results show that, when the jump 
event occurs at different times, a decision-maker 
should employ different investment strategies. 
We note some limitations with our approach. For 
example, first-mover advantage is not included in our 
current model. An important theoretical perspective is 
that a bank should invest in m-payment systems tech-
nology at the early stage to gain first-mover advantage. 
Once a specific m-payment technology is successfully 
developed and adopted, it will achieve strong network 
effects. The first-mover will be rewarded with very 
high payoffs from developing the network. This, how-
ever, is not in the model either yet. Another limitation 
of our model is that we assume the bank can immedi-
ately implement an m-payment solution once it makes 
the investment decision. This assumption makes it pos-
sible for benefits to flow into the bank without any 
additional uncertainty of a value lag. The reality is dif-
ferent, of course: a bank will need some period of time, 
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which is of uncertain length, to develop the necessary 
infrastructure. So the business value from investment 
will be obtained only some time later. Finally, our re-
sults are theoretical: they cannot be validated because 
m-payment systems are not mature enough to provide 
successful cases of investment and implementation.  
We are currently extending this research in two 
ways. We are continuing our modeling work, with the 
idea of including first-mover advantage. The bank, 
when making the investment decision, must consider 
the tradeoff between the advantage achieved in its role 
as an early network developer and the uncertainty risks 
brought on by the early adoption of a new technology. 
This will support our efforts to generalize our analysis 
approach to real-world settings.  
We also are extending our work with numerical 
analysis. For example, we are using simulations to test 
our findings for a larger set of parameter values. We 
expect to discover systematic relationships between the 
model outcomes, and the parameter values of interest, 
such as the volatility of costs and benefits, and the 
probability that a jump of a given magnitude will oc-
cur. We are also interested in identifying exogenous 
risk factors that affect investment decision quality.  
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Appendix, Table A1. Modeling notation 
 
 Definition Comments 
V Investment value at time t PV of future benefits flows B 
B Benefits flows at time t Fluctuates over time 
I Bank's investment I  For m-payment technology 
ROV Real option value For the deferral option 
αB Benefit drift (+) Subject to Brownian motion 
αI Investment drift (-) Subject to Brownian motion also 
σB Standard deviation of B Affects volatility of benefits 
σI Standard deviation of I Affects volatility of costs 
ηB Risk premium on B Due to benefits uncertainty 
ηI Risk premium on I  Due to investment uncertainty 
ρBI Correlation of B and I  ρBI  = 0: uncorrelated cost-benefit  
rf Risk-free discount rate Discounts future benefits and costs 
dz Wiener increment  Defines standard Brownian motion 
t Point in time  dt is a small increment in time 
T 
Maximum deferral time;  
number of periods over 
which cash flows occur 
Bounds the option's exercise time; 
cash flows can be benefits or costs 
for the bank from 0 İ ´ İ T – t 
λ Mean number of jumps per unit of time 
In the time interval dt, probability 
that a jump will occur is λdt 
k Change % for benefit flows, B 
Due to a jump, and k ≡ E(Y − 1) 
Y 
 value, random variable Measures after shock change 
q(t) Shock-led jump process  Changes in value q is given by dq 
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